

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8352

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 CAIRO 14826

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR EG US

SUBJ: SADAT ON RIYADH AND CAIRO SUMMITS

REF: (A) STATE 268212, (B) STATE 268211

1. SUMMARY: CONVEYED TO SADAT YOUR APPRECIATION OF HIS ROLE AT RIYADH AND CAIRO SUMMITS AND PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF RIYADH AGREEMENT. WHILE SHARING VIEW THAT TEST OF RIYADH AGREEMENT DEPENDS ON ITS APPLICATION, SADAT EXPRESSED HIS OWN SATISFACTION WITH OUTCOME. HIS OWN AND EGYPT'S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN EASTERN ARAB WORLD HAD BEEN RE-AFFIRMED BY ARAB HEADS OF STATE, INCLUDING ASAD. MUCH WILL DEPEND ON SARKIS. ARAB HEADS OF STATE HAVE INDEED FORMALLY ENDORSED HIM AND GIVEN HIM ADF TOOL, BUT SARKIS TENDS TO BE TOO MUCH OF A COMPROMISER AND IS NOT DECISIVE ENOUGH. GOE WILL CONTINUE TO IMPRESS UPON SARKIS NEED FOR INDEPENDENT POLICY. EGYPTIAN/SYRIAN RECONCILIATION HAD BEEN ACHIEVED, DESPITE DIRE PREDICTIONS OF MANY, AND ASAD HAD ACCEDED TO SADAT'S WISHES. (HE IGNORED CONTINUED PREPONDERANCE OF SYRIAN MILITARY STRENGTH IN LEBANON.) ASAD/HUSSEIN "SCHEME" TO WREST LEADERSHIP FROM EGYPT WAS RECOGNIZED TO BE UNACHIEVABLE. SYRIANS MUST STILL BE WATCHED, BUT SADAT AFFIRMED HIS CONFIDENCE IN ASAD. IN CONTRAST, EVEN THOUGH RECONCILIATION ALSO ACHIEVED WITH HUSSEIN,

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SADAT STILL REGARDS LATTER AS UNTRUSTWORTHY.

PLO HAS LEARNED A LESSON, BUT SHOULD STILL PARTICIPATE FROM OUTSET IN GENEVA CONFERENCE. ALTHOUGH ARAB LEADERS COULD NOT SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCT PLO NOT TO ENGAGE IN MILITANT ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL, WHICH STILL OCCUPIES ARAB LANDS, THEY HAD STRESSED NEED FOR PLO TO RESPECT LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE AND TO DO NOTHING HARMFUL TO LEBANESE SECURITY. ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT SEEK TO EXPLOIT BORDER AREAS. THREE ISRAELI POLITICIANS HAD RECENTLY MET WITH ISRAELIS IN PARIS TO DISCUSS PLO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL. RESULTS HAD BEEN INCONCLUSIVE, BUT SADAT WAS HEARTENED BY MEETING. ARAFAT HAD BEEN A DISAPPOINTMENT AT SUMMITS, AND KING KHALIF AND VARIOUS OTHERS HAD AFTERWARDS PROPOSED TO SADAT THAT HE BE REMOVED. SADAT RESPONDED THIS SHOULD NOT BE DONE UNTIL AFTER GENEVA RESUMES, SINCE HE WAS CONCERNED THAT ASAD STILL HARBORS THE IDEA OF CREATING AN UNACCEPTABLE PRO-SYRIAN TRIUMVIRATE LEADERSHIP OVER PLO.

SADAT AGREED ON NEED TO INSTILL CONFIDENCE IN LEBANESE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY TO STRENGTHEN SARKIS'S HAND TO ENCOURAGE CHRISTIAN LEADERS TO BE REASONABLE. HE WAS PLEASED THAT WE ARE SENDING OUR CHARGE TO MEET WITH CHRISTIAN LEADERS AND TO URGE RESTRAINT AND COOPERATION ON ALL. IN WAZ RIYADH AND CAIRO AGREEMENTS, US CAN HELP IN LEBANON BY (A) STOPPING ISRAEL FROM EXPLOITING LEBANESE SITUATION BY TRYING TO BUILD CONTACTS WITH BORDER VILLAGES AND (B) CONTACTING CHAMOUN AND RIGHTIST ELEMENTS TO URGE THEM SUPPORT SARKIS AND GIVE HIM OPPORTUNITY FULFILL AGREEMENTS. SADAT TALKS WITH ASAD HAVE CONVINCED HIM THAT SYRIAN PRESIDENT IS READY TO PROCEED WITH COMPREHENSIVE PEACE PROCESS. ASAD MAY BE DEMANDING AND "AUCTIONEER", BUT HE WILL COOPERATE. END SUMMARY

2. HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM TWO HOUR MEETING WITH SADAT AT THE BARRAGES. VP MUBARAK WAS PRESENT. APART FROM PERSPIRING PROFUSELY, PRESIDENT LOOKED WELL AND WAS RELAXED AND BUOYANT.

3. AFTER CONVEYING YOUR WARM REGARDS, I FIRST
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CONGRATULATED SADAT ON THE SUCCESS OF THE RIYADH AND CAIRO SUMMITS AND CONVEYED YOUR WARM APPRECIATION OF THE ROLE HE PLAYED AT THOSE MEETINGS. THE SUMMITS WERE ONCE AGAIN A TRIBUTE TO SADAT'S STATEMANSHIP AND CLEARLY ENHANCED HIS LEADERSHIP STATURE IN THE ARAB WORLD. SADAT WAS PLEASED AND INDICATED HIS OWN SATISFACTION WITH THE TWO SUMMIT CONFERENCES. THE EGYPTIAN "PLAN" HAD FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES BEEN

ACCEPTED. THE SUMMITS HAD DEMONSTRATED ONCE AGAIN, FIRST, HIS OWN LEADERSHIP ROLE AND, SECOND, THAT OF EGYPT, IN THE ARAB WORLD. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO CHAIR BOTH THE MINI SUMMIT IN RIYADH AND THE CAIRO SUMMIT.

4. RIYADH AGREEMENT: I THEN WENT THROUGH OUR PRELIMINARY IMPRESSIONS OF THE RIYADH AGREEMENT AS SET FORTH REFTEL B. NOTING REAL TEST WILL BE AGREEMENT'S APPLICATION, I TOLD SADAT THAT WE VIEW THE RIYADH AGREEMENT AS LAYING A POSITIVE BASIS TO TERMINATE THE AGONIZING LEBANESE CONFLICT AND TO ESTORE THE NEEDED UNITY AMONG KEY ARAB STATES TO ENABLE THE PEACE PROCESS TO BE RESUMED. SADAT AGREED THAT WE MUST STILL SEE HOW THE AGREEMENT WILL BE APPLIED, AND CONCEDED THAT THERE WILL BE DIFFICULTIES, BUT EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE MOMENTUM ACHIEVED AT THE TWO CONFERENCES CAN BE MAINTAINED AND THAT PEACE IN LEBANON MAY NOW GRADUALLY BE RESTORED. GIVEN THE PASSIONS THAT HAVE BEEN AROUSED ON ALL SIDES, IT MIGHT STILL TAKE AWHILE, BUT IF SARKIS ACTS DECISIVELY, CONTINUED POSITIVE MOVEMENT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE. HE RELATED THAT AL SYG MAHMOUD RIAD HAD TOLD HIM YESTERDAY OF AN URGENT TELEPHONE CALL FROM SARKIS ASKING THAT THE NEEDED ARAB DETERRENT FORCE (ADF) REINFORCEMENTS BE RAPIDLY SENT AND ALSO ASKING FOR ARAB FINANCIAL HELP.

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

5. SARKIS: SADAT'S REFERENCE TO SARKIS PROVIDED THE OPPORTUN-

ITY' TO STRESS OUR VIEW THAT THE CENTRAL ROLE OF SARKIS HAD BEEN UNDERSCORED BY THE TWO SUMMITS. SARKIS WAS DEMONSTRABLY GIVEN A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE BY THE ARAB HEADS OF STATE AND ALSO THE ADF TO ENFORCE THE STEPS HE MAY HAVE TO TAKE. THIS SHOULD INCREASE HIS ABILITY TO SECURE THE NEEDED CONCESSIONS AND COMPROMISES TO REACH A POLITICAL SOLUTION. AGAIN SATDAT AGREED, BUT EXPRESSED SLIGHT CONCERN THAT SARKIS IS TO MUCH OF A COMPROMISER AND NOT DECISIVE ENOUGH. HE IS THE ELECTED PRESIDENT OF LEBANON AND EGYPT AND THE OTHER ARAB STATES WILL WORK WITH HIM, BUT SADAT MADE IT CLEAR THAT GOE WILL CONTINUE TO IMPRESS UPON SARKIS THE NEED TO BE DECISIVE AND MOVE TOWARD AN INDEPENDENT POLICY.

6. EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN RECONCILIATION:

WHEN I MENTIONED OUR SATISFACTION OVER THE RECONCILIATION BETWEEN EGYPT AND SYRIA AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE PEACE PROCESS, SADAT AGREED THIS WAS SO. NOTING THAT MANY HAD SAID EGYPTIAN/SYRIAN TENSIONS WERE IRREVOCABLE, HE SAID SUCH PROPHETS OF DOOM HAD BEEN PROVEN WRONG. THE ARABS, HE OBSERVED, INVARIABLY FIGHT AMONG THEMSELVES AND THEN MAKE UP IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE COMMON OBJECTIVE. BUT SADAT WENT ON TO INSIST THAT ASAD HAD RECOGNIZED HIS NEED FOR EGYPT'S HELP. ASAD HAD FINALLY ACCEPTED SADAT'S SIX-SIDED
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PROPOSAL FOR RIYADH AFTER TRYING THREE TIME TO HAVE OTHER FORMULAE ACCEPTED. ASAD HAD REPEATED REFERRED TO EGYPT AS THE "MOTHER OF THE ARABS" AND HAD AT ALL TIMES SHOWN HIS DEFERENCE TOWARD SADAT. ASAD HAD ALSO TAKEN INITIATIVE TO NOMINATE GAMMSY AS C-M-C JOINT EGYPTIAN/SYRIAN COMMAND AND, TOGETHER WITH USEIN, TO RENEW MAHMOUD RIAD'S TERM AS ALSYG. (SADAT WAS CLEARLY PLEASED WITH SYMBOLISM OF ASAD'S ACTIONS VIS-A-VIS HIM AND EGYPT.

7. HE, SADAT, HAD TOLD ASAD AT RIYADH THAT TWO THINGS WERE NECESSARY IF THE RIYADH SUMMIT WAS TO SUCCEED: FIRST, WHILE SYRIA MIGHT HAVE THE LARGEST NUMBER OF TROOPS IN LEBANON, ASAD SHOULD NOT RPT NOT ATTEMPT TO HAVE A SYRIAN COMMANDER CHOSEN TO HEAD THE FORCE; SECOND, ASAD SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO REPLACE ARAFAT WITH ZUHAYR MUHSIN. NEITHER OF THESE TWO THINGS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO EGYPT. ASAD HAD IMMEDIATELY AGREED AND HAD MADE NO ATTEMPT TO PRESENT THESE TWO ISSUES. (SADAT SAID NOTHING ABOUT CONTINUED PREPONDANCE OF SYRIAN MILITARY IN LEBANON). ASAD HAD ALSO ADMITTED HIS MISTAKE FOR ATTACKING SINAI II AND URGING HUSSEIN TO DO SO. AS SADAT SAW IT, THE ASAD/HUSSEIN "SCHEME" TO WREST THE LEADERSHIP OF THE

EASTERN ARAB WORLD FROM EGYPT WAS FINALLY RECOGNIZED BY ITS TWO PROPONENTS TO BE UNACHIEVABLE. THE SYRIANS MUST STILL BE WATCHED, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE PALESTINIANS, BUT SADAT AFFIRMED HIS CONFIDENCE IN ASAD. IN CONTRAST, HE NOTED THAT HE HAD NO CONFIDENCE IN HUSSEIN. AT ASAD'S REQUEST, HE HAD AGREED TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH JORDAN, BUT HUSSEIN WAS AND REMAINS UNTRUSTWORTHY.

8. PLO: I THEN INDICATED OUR HOPE THAT THE PLO WILL HAVE LEARNED THAT PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE REQUIRES A MORE REALISTIC PERCEPTION OF WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED IN THE FUTURE. FURTHERMORE, PLO MILITARY ACTIONS FROM BASES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WILL SABOTAGE WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN RIYADH AND CAIRO. SADAT SAID HE THOUGH THE PLO HAS LEARNED A LESSON, BUT STRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT IT SHOULD PARTICIPATE FROM THE OUTSET IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. ON THE USE OF BASES IN SOUTH LEBANON TO
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ATTACK ISRAEL , HE SAID THE ARAB HEADS OF STATE COULD NOT MAKE THIS POINT TO THE PALESTINIANS DIRECTLY SO LONG AS THE ISRAELIS STILL OCCUPIES ARAB LANDS. THE ARAB LEADERS HAD DONE SO INDIRECTLY, HOWEVER, BY STRESSING THE NEED FOR THE PLO TO RESPECT LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE AND DO NOTHING THAT MIGHT HARM LEBANESE SECURITY. AT THE SAME TIME, SADAT NOTED, ISRAEL SHOULD NOT SEEK TO EXPLOIT THE AREA ALONG THE BORDER BY ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH VILLAGEERS OR OTHER PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS.

9. PLO/ISRAELI CONTACTS: AT THIS POINT MUBARAK SHOWED SADAT A REPORT THAT HAD JUST BEEN RECEIVED FROM EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT THREE ISRAELI POLITICAL LEADER HAD TWICE MET WITH PLO REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS RECENTLY IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON PLO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL. THE THREE ISRAELIS WERE EX-GENERAL MATTI BILD, PROFESSOR AVINERI AND AN ECONOMIST NAMED JACOB ARTON. PLO REPS HAD TOLD ISRAELIS THAT THEY COULD NOT NOW FORMALLY RECOGNIZE ISRAEL, BUT THAT SUCH RECOGNITION WOULD BE AUTOMATIC ONCE THE PLO PARTICIPATES IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. THE ISRAELI REPS FOUND THIS INSUFFICIENT. SADAT WAS HEARTENED, NEVERTHELESS, BY THE FACT THAT SOME ISRAELI POLITICIANS HAVE SOUGHT OUT PLO REPS TO DISCUSS ISSUES BETWEEN THEM.

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

10. ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT LEADERSHIP CHANGES MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN THE PLO, SADAT OPINED ARAFAT, WILL SOONER OR LATER HAVE TO GO. ARAFAT HAD PERFORMED BADLY AT THE CAIRO SUMMIT AND FAILED TO IMPRESS THE ARAB LEADERS. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SUMMIT, KING KHALID AND VARIOUS OTHER ARAB HEADS OF STATE HAD APPROACHED SADAT TO EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN ABOUT ARAFAT AND TO SUGGEST STEPS BE TAKEN TO REMOVE HIM. SADAT CLAIMED HE HAD URGED THAT THIS NOT BE DONE UNTIL AFTER GENEVA RESUMES. HE HAD POINTED OUT THAT ASAD STILL HARBORS THE IDEA OF CREATING A PRO-SYRIAN LEADERSHIP IN THE PLO AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE AVOIDED. ASKED WHO ASAD HAS IN MIND, SADAT CLAIMED THE SYRIAN PRESIDENT FAVORS A TRIPARTITE LEADERSHIP CONSISTING OF KHALID AL-FAHUM, ZUHAYR MUHSIN AND ONE OTHER PERSON WHOSE NAME HE COULD NOT REMEMBER. SADAT SAID HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO ASAD AND TO THE ARAB HEADS OF STATE THAT EGYPT WILL NOT ACCEPT KHALID AL FAHUM AND THAT ZUHAYR MUHSIN HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCREDITED.

11. LEBANESE CHRISTINA: DRAWING UPON PARA 2 (G), OF REF B, I DWELT AT

LENGTH ON CURRENT CHRISTIAN ANXIETIES AND THE NEED TO ALLAY CHRISTIAN CONCERNS THAT THEIR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS WILL NOT BE RESPECTED. ANY SUCH DEVELOPMENT WILL ONLY REINFORCE EXTREMIST INFLUENCES AMONG THE CHRISTIANS OR CAUSE THEM TO RETURN TO THE IDEA OF PARTITION.

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WHAT IS NEEDED IS A POSITIVE APPROACH TO GIVE THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY CONFIDENCE THAT IT CAN LIVE IN SECURITY AND MAINTAIN ITS ESSENTIAL COMMUNAL IDENTITY. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD ALSO STRENGTHEN SARKIS' HAND AND ENCOURAGE THE CHRISTIAN LEADERS TO BE REASONABLE AND HONOR THE CEASEFIRE. I NOTED WE ARE SENDING OUR CHARGE IN BEIRUT ACROSS THE LINE TO SEE SARKIS AND ALSO TO MAKE THESE POINTS TO CHAMOUN, GEMAYEL, FRANGIE AND OTHER KEY CHRISTIAN LEADERS.

12. SADAT AGREED THAT THIS WILL BE AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN FORGING REAL PEACE IN LEBANON. HE CLAIMED THAT THE ARAB LEADERS HAVE THIS ASPECT VERY MUCH IN MIND, ALTHOUGH THE ACTIONS OF SOME CHRISTIAN LEADERS, ESPECIALLY CHAMOUN, HAVE NOT MADE THINGS ANY EASIER. HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR THAT WE ARE SENDING OUR CHARGE TO THE CHRISTIAN AREAS TO URGE RESTRAINT AND COOPERATION ON THE KEY CHRISTIAN LEADERS.

13. WHAT US CAN DO TO HELP: ASKED WHAT HE THOUGH US MIGHT DO TO HELP REINFORCE THE POSITIVE TRENDS GENERATED BY THE RIYADH AND CAIRO AGREEMENTS, SADAT SAID HE HAD TWO SUGGESTIONS: FIRST, WE SHOULD STOP ISRAEL FROM EXPLOITING THE LEBANESE SITUATION OR EXERTING PRESSURE AS IT IS DOING NOW ON CERTAIN LEBANESE ELEMENTS OR TRYING TO BUILD CONTACTS WITH THE BORDER VILLAGES. SECOND, WE SHOULD CONTACT CHAMOUN AND RIGHTIST LEBANESE ELEMENTS TO IMPRESS UPON THEM THE NEED TO SUPPORT SARKIS AND TO GIVE THE NEW LEBANESE PRESIDENT THE OPPORTUNITY TO FULFILL THE AGREEMENTS.

14. SYRIA AND PEACE PROCESS: I ALSO ASKED SADAT FOR HIS IMPRESSIONS OF ASAD'S VIEWS ON THE PEACE PROCESS. SADAT CLAIMED THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. HE HAD TOLD ASAD THAT THE USG HAD COMMITTED ITSELF TO UNDERTAKE A GLOBAL SETTLEMENT IN 1977. HE HAD FRANKLY TOLD ASAD THAT THE SYRIAN PRESIDENT HAD LOST HIS OPPORTUNITY FOR A GOLAN II, SINCE EGYPT WILL NO LONGER AGREE TO ANY STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH. THE GOLAN PROBLEM MUST BE HANDLED IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. SADAT THOUGHT THAT ASAD WILL BE DEMANDING AND WILL "AUCTIONEER", BUT THAT HE WILL DO SO IN THE CONTEXT OF COOPERATING WITH
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THE US-EGYPTIAN STRATEGY TO PROCEED ON A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

15. OTHER MATTERS DISCUSSED WILL BE REPORTED BY SEPTELS.
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